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Introduction 
Mark Addis (St. Mary’s University) and Christopher Winch (King’s College London) 
This volume brings together a number of related contributions on the topic of expertise and 
education. Expertise is a topic that is beginning to receive more attention in the Philosophy of 
Education and discussions are closely related to the epistemological debate concerning the 
nature of know-how which has also burgeoned in recent years within ‘mainstream’ 
epistemology. More specifically, this volume focuses on the relevance of expertise to 
professional education and practice, with the aim on shedding light on what is involved in 
professional expertise and the implications of a sound understanding of professional expertise 
for professional education.1 Although all contributions have roots in philosophical discussion, 
there is an element of cross-disciplinarity among them, reflecting the advances that have been 
made to our understanding of expertise from psychology in particular.  
 
Two senses of expertise 
 
It cannot be stressed too much that any philosophical engagement with expertise and 
professional education will need to take account of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle in two 
important respects (see the extended discussion of Ryle by Lum in this volume). The first is 
his characterisation of ‘intelligence epithets’ (Ryle 1946, 1949) as applicable to know-how in 
a way that they are not applicable to singular attributions of propositional knowledge. Ryle’s 
discussion of intelligence epithets has not received the attention that it deserves, but is 
important in understanding how expertise is related to know-how. Second, Ryle’s discussion 
of ‘adverbial verbs’ (Ryle 1979) alerts us to the difficulties of characterising all know-how, 
and by implication professional expertise, in terms of skills. Ryle’s account of adverbial 
verbs is particularly important for a range of professional activities which cannot be 
adequately be characterised as skills: planning, co-ordination, communication, control and 
evaluation, which are all characteristics of occupations whose practice requires a degree of 
independence, teamwork and professional discretion. The vocational education and training 
(VET) systems of some countries such as Germany place a particular emphasis on such 
attributes calling them (Fähigkeiten) as opposed to skills (Fertigkeiten) (see Hanf 2011). 
                                                          
1 By ‘professional education’ we mean not only the education of the recognised professions and the semi-
professions (Etzioni 1969), but also the education of those engaging in non-professional but recognised 
occupations. 
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Although Ryle is referred to intermittently in this volume, the relevance of his contributions 
in this area looms large. These contributions touch on a number of themes which are 
important in understanding expertise and, perhaps even more important, in avoiding 
confusions about it.  
 
The first is a potential confusion about whether expertise is something that one  has in virtue 
of possession of a certain kind of know-how. Thus, I could be said to be an expert in English 
in virtue of it being my mothertongue (Collins 2013 and for a critique see Addis 2013). In 
this sense, all native speakers of English are experts in English.2 Let us call this the 
constitutive sense of expertise. We will be interested in this sense of ‘expertise’, particularly 
in relation to the contrast between someone who is competent in an occupation and someone 
who is not, and it is important to recognise this sense of ‘expertise’, as it is sometimes 
confused with the other sense, which is also important to our discussion. This is the idea that 
for a given activity-type or occupation, someone can be more expert than another 
practitioner. Let us call this the relative sense of expertise. It is common to claim that not 
only can one identify one practitioner’s expertise relative to another’s, but that one can give 
an account of what this difference in expertise consists in. Sometimes this is done through a 
graded hierarchy ranging from novice to expert as in the popular schemata set out by Hubert 
and Stuart Dreyfus (e.g. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1996). It can also be done less formally by 
appealing to the Rylean notion of an intelligence epithet which yields appropriate evaluative 
vocabularies relating to  the various dimensions which relative expertise involves: situational, 
technical, theoretical, moral and aesthetic, all related to the particular sphere of activity in 
which they are applied. 
 
It is important to keep these senses of ‘expertise’ distinct, because of our interest not only in 
whether or not someone is capable at some threshold level of practising an occupation, but 
also in the degree to which someone advances in relative expertise by comparison to their 
previous level of competence and in their expert standing within the occupation relative to 
others. This concern is evident in the papers by Gobet on the detail of expertise amongst 
already-competent chess players as opposed to masters and grandmasters, in Bucelli’s 
concern with independent action within teaching, in Winch’s concerns with how growing 
                                                          
2 Strictly, in informal spoken English. They may not even be competent in writing and in certain genres of 
speech (e.g. rhetoric) or in writing. We can also apply the concept of relative expertise to all of these 
categories of mastery of English. 
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perceptual ability is part and parcel of growing expertise and in Keestra’s with 
characterisations of the growth of expertise.  
 
Why is it important for professional education that these two senses be kept distinct from 
each other? There are two main points. The first is concerned with initial qualification and 
licensure within an occupation. A qualification is a guarantee, not just to the practitioners of 
the occupation but to the public and society at large that the holder can practice that 
occupation to at least a threshold degree of competence. The importance of such guarantees 
can hardly be exaggerated since they not only concern efficiency in practising the occupation 
but also the protection of client and public welfare. This applies across a vast range of 
occupations, not just the recognised professions and semi-professions. Initial professional 
qualifications are primarily concerned with the constitutive sense of expertise as they are 
expected to guarantee that a holder can operate at a threshold level of competence that at the 
very least marks him or her as more capable than a layperson. On the other hand, it may also 
be that an initial qualification aims to distinguish between degrees of competence. BTEC 
qualifications which award a pass, a merit or a distinction are examples of such qualifications 
(e.g. Edexcel 2008). In this case, expertise is being assessed in a relative sense as well within 
the same qualification.  
 
The second point concerns progression within an occupation. A conscientious practitioner 
will be expected to improve with experience and further study. We would expect an 
increasing range of positive intelligence epithets to apply to their professional actions. 
Whether we make informal judgements about this growth in ability or seek to formalise it 
with post-initial qualifications, we are here concerned with the relative sense of expertise, 
considering progression in excellence within an occupation. Here another important theme 
emerges, the idea that expertise in this sense involves the pursuit of excellence within the 
occupational field. It is noteworthy that some national VET systems, such as that of 
Germany, have enhanced professional educational qualifications recognised at level 6, which 
are generally called Meister qualifications, which demand not just technical excellence in the 
chosen occupation, but also pedagogic and entrepreneurial ability. A Meister would typically 
have responsibility for the workplace learning of those pursuing an initial qualification in 
his/her enterprise, Auszubildende or apprentices. Thus progression within the occupation is 
not just a matter of ascending levels of technical competence, but also of increasing 
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polyvalence in activities (see Syben 2008 for a comparison of how this is handled in the 
German and Hungarian construction sectors). 
 
The intellectualist-anti-intellectualist debate and its relevance to professional action. 
 
The second major theme concerns the relationship between the so-called intellectualist –anti-
intellectualist debate about the nature of know-how and whether or not it should be subsumed 
as a form of propositional knowledge (Bengson and Moffett 2007 and Stanley and 
Williamson 2001), or whether it should be considered a distinct, or even the dominant 
epistemological category, a view which is perhaps most strongly associated with Gilbert Ryle 
writing in the 1940s (Ryle 1946 and 1949). The debate really took on life once again with the 
publication of Stanley and Williamson (2001), but was foreshadowed by two important 
papers published by David Carr (1979 and 1981) respectively and also in White (1982). 
Unfortunately, the debate has largely been confined to the pages of mainstream 
epistemological journals, with little evidence of engagement either within or with the 
philosophy of education community. Notable exceptions include work by Kotzee (2016) and 
Winch (2009, 2010a). This is unfortunate as one of the features of this debate in the 
mainstream philosophical journals is a focus on a range of technical issues and a narrow 
range of examples, generally far removed from considerations of professional action.3  
 
Intellectualist accounts come in two main forms, propositional and non-propositional 
(Bengson and Moffett 2011b). On the propositional account advocated by Stanley and 
Williamson (2001) for someone to know how to do something is for them to be acquainted 
with a way of doing that thing in a practical mode of presentation and in a contextually 
relevant manner (op.cit.p.430). For the non-propositional account (Bengson and Moffett 
2007), for someone to know how to do something is to be acquainted with a way of doing 
that thing. In both cases, it is assumed that knowing how to do something involves a 
relationship with a way of doing that thing. The validity of this critical assumption does not 
seem to be questioned within the literature on the topic, although Ryle (1979) in his 
discussion of adverbial verbs had raised the possibility that there may be many different ways 
of doing the same thing. More radically we might question whether or not knowing how to do 
something does always presuppose that the agent knows a way to do that thing. It may be that 
                                                          
3 But see Wiggins (2012) for more complex examples. 
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an agent who knows how to do something, such as solving a problem, knows how to find a 
way to solve that problem. Another important consideration raised by Hornsby (2011), is that 
knowing how to do something does not involve being able to do it once, but repeatedly and 
with appropriate contextual variation. This would rule out the kind of singular instance of an 
action type being a sufficient condition of know-how along the lines that Stanley and 
Williamson advocate. 
 
The anti-intellectualist Rylean account of know-how is generally thought to underpin 
vocational qualifications that depend on learning outcomes related to the carrying out of 
relatively simple tasks, such as lower level NVQs, trenchantly criticised by Hyland (1993). 
Despite the fact that many of Ryle’s examples involve complex and quite intellectual 
activities such as giving courtroom speeches or playing chess (discussed in detail here by 
Gobet), it is reasonable to suggest that Ryle’s work may have been an inspiration to the 
designers of the NVQ, a qualification suited to Taylorised routine semi-skilled work. 
However, it is perhaps more surprising to find that some intellectualist accounts can also lend 
themselves to such an interpretation (see Addis in this volume). According to Stanley and 
Williamson, it is sufficient for an agent to know how to F that the agent perform F on one 
occasion. This is equivalent to the third person manifestation of knowledge of a single 
proposition. Thus an NVQ descriptor could just as easily fit an intellectualist know-how 
attribution as could a non-intellectualist one if interpreted according to the approach 
recommended by Stanley and Williamson. 
 
What is missing here? There are three points to make about the requirements for the proper 
attribution of know-how to an agent. The first is that the agent be able to repeat the relevant 
action in contextually variable situations (Hornsby op.cit.). Stanley and Williamson’s 
intellectualist account does not meet this criterion.4 Bengson and Moffett’s intellectualist 
account only requires that the agent be able to give an account of how something is done. 
Second, neither the strictly Rylean anti-intellectualist nor the intellectualist of either the 
propositional or non-propositional variety is capable of showing how it is that theoretical 
considerations have a bearing on professional action. This is quite disabling if one wishes to 
use either of these two approaches to know-how as a way of explaining professional action. 
Third, intellectualists, because they subsume know-how to a relationship between a knower 
                                                          
4 In ‘A knows how to F’, ‘F’ signifies an action-type, not a token action. Tokens of the type are subject to 
contextual variation.  
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and singular propositions, are unable to incorporate Ryle’s insight about intelligence epithets 
into their accounts.5 One cannot apply an intelligence epithet meaningfully to someone’s 
knowledge of a single proposition. Once again, this is disabling for a philosophical account 
that aims to explain what either senses of professional expertise involves. 
 
But even here we have not fully set out the inadequacies of the capacity of intellectualism to 
account for professional action. Transversal abilities (what the Germans call Fähigkeiten) are 
critical to professional action. These are examples of the ‘adverbial verbs’ of which Ryle 
talked in his later work (see above) and cannot be reduced to ways of doing things. Critical to 
their mastery is the ability to accomplish diverse activities in ways that exhibit both 
independent action and the ability to co-ordinate with and pay regard to the work of others. 
They demand a degree of seriousness and attention that mark them off from the more routine 
exercise of skill and often involve both proximal and distal situational awareness (see Keestra 
in this volume). Whatever its shortcomings in failing to acknowledge the importance of 
systematic knowledge to practice, Rylean ‘anti-intellectualism’ is quite comfortable with the 
Fähigkeiten up to the point at which they do not require this. 
 
The second area which is a blind spot for intellectualism in relation to professional action is 
that of tacit knowledge.6 Although there is a general consensus that tacit knowledge is only 
with difficulty, if at all, articulable by its possessor (‘We know more than we can say’ – 
Polanyi 1958), some commentators think of it in propositional rather than practical terms. In 
Psycholinguistic theory for example, tacit knowledge is a body of organised grammatical 
propositions which are ‘cognised’ rather than ‘recognised’ by a speaker as a condition of 
thought and communication (e.g. Chomsky 1988). Some commentators think that tacit 
knowledge can be captured in propositions and applied to computer-based expert systems, 
while others deny this but hold that some form of contextual but discursive articulation 
should be possible (Gascoigne and Thornton 2013). Our view is that tacit knowledge is an 
aspect of know-how which is beyond articulation, although some transfer might be possible 
through exemplification, imitation and practise (see also Read and Hutchinson 2011). 
                                                          
5 One might argue that the point does not apply to bodies of knowledge, such as might be held by an academic 
subject expert. However, the expert is not someone who simply know large collections of propositions, but is 
someone who can find their way around a body of knowledge, itself a form of know-how (Winch 2010b). 
6 See Polanyi (1958) for one of the early uses of the term and for a systematic contemporary exposition see 
Gascoigne and Thornton (2013). Also see Addis in this volume on the difficulty of expressing tacit knowledge as 
knowing that.  
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Given that the issue is of enormous importance for professional action, one would expect that 
it would be addressed by the main currents of philosophical thought concerning know-how. 
Conventional intellectualist accounts struggle here. Stanley and Williamson’s reliance on 
third person attributions of knowledge of ways to agents falls on the contextual variability of 
action-types, whose variation is often manifested through the tacit knowledge required to deal 
with this contextual variability. Since they are committed to a view that know-how can be 
manifested through knowledge of a way to F in a single instance, they have nothing to say 
either about contextual variability (as opposed to contextual appropriateness of a single 
action) or a fortiori about the ways in which variability is manifested in professional action.7 
Tacit knowledge is also manifested in the ability to find a way to achieve an end, something 
about which intellectualism has nothing to say. The ability to employ tacit knowledge 
effectively is also in many cases a feature of relative expertise as opposed to novicehood or 
competence and underlies the attribution of intelligence epithets. Again, intellectualism has 
nothing to say about this. It is not surprising that attempts have been made to go beyond the 
intellectualist/anti-intellectualist dichotomy in seeking to gain a better understanding of 
expertise. Kotzee and Smit’s article in this volume is an important contribution to this debate. 
 
Towards a criterial conception of expertise 
 
Kotzee and Smit in this volume distinguish between constructivist and realist accounts of 
expertise. Crudely speaking, the constructivist holds that expertise consists in no more than 
the attributions of expertise of others to the putative expert.8 Realists, on the other hand 
consider expertise to be a real epistemic attribute of an expert, whether this be conceived in 
practical or propositional terms or both. Kotzee and Smit maintain that there are elements of 
truth in both of these approaches to expertise and that they are reconciliable. We will not 
discuss the details of their argument here, but will go on to briefly outline another way of 
looking at the matter, which is related both to the discussion of know-how and expertise in 
the previous section, but also to our discussion of professional education below. 
                                                          
7 Bengson and Moffett (2011a) provide the case of Pat the ski instructor, who cannot do the stunts that her 
pupils are trying to perform. Nevertheless, she can give an account of how to do them and this is sufficient to 
attribute the relevant know-how to her, according to Bengson and Moffett. Whatever else one might say of 
this example, it is evident that Pat could not manifest any tacit knowledge in her knowing how to perform the 
stunts, since she cannot perform them. 
8 We assume that they are referring to both constitutive and relative senses of expertise. 
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Our view is that professional expertise is delineated by criteria which allow a community to 
distinguish between novicehood, competence and expertise.9 These criteria are embedded in 
practices of training, habituation, education, evaluation and qualification which are more than 
intersubjective agreements: they have an institutional foundation with its own set of implicit 
ways of doing things and formal and informal rules for making necessary distinctions. In the 
case of professional education we expect these rules to be relatively formalised. Thus 
expertise is attributed by some to others, but the way in which this is done is far from 
arbitrary. Expert practise makes a real difference to how well an agent acts. This does not 
imply, however, that there are some identifiable attributes (like certain brain structures) 
which make an expert what s/he is, although they may be necessary conditions of experthood 
(see  Kotzee and Smit, Gobet and Keestra in this volume), but rather the ability to meet 
relevant criteria, as evidenced in action, is what makes an attribution of experthood true or 
false and allows us to place our trust in professional qualifications, which are formal 
expressions of at least some of these criteria.10 
 
How does a criterial account of expertise match up to the requirements that we set out in the 
previous section? We will address this question in relation to criteria for professional 
expertise and in relation to the implications for professional education and assessment. It 
might be objected that criterialism is just a form of realism in disguise, as to truly say that a 
criterion has been satisfied is to say it corresponds to the fact that the criterion has been 
satisfied. On the other hand, if a criterion is satisfied when an authoritative individual deems 
it to have been satisfied, then the operation of the criterion is socially constructed. So there is 
nothing distinctive about the criterial view of expertise.11 To reply only briefly, on the one 
hand it does not follow that if it is true that a criterion has been satisfied that there is a 
corresponding fact that satisfies the criterion. That would only follow if one held that for any 
true proposition there is something in reality (a fact) which corresponds to it.12 On the other 
hand, someone’s saying that a criterion has been satisfied is not sufficient, on a criterial 
account, for that being so. Not only would the individual making the pronouncement have to 
                                                          
9 These latter two terms referring to constitutive and relative expertise respectively. 
10 See Ellenbogen (2003) for a discussion of truth along these lines. 
11 A point made by Kotzee and Smit in correspondence with the editors. 
12 On the criterial account of truth developed by Ellenbogen, it does not follow from p is true, that there is 
something real which corresponds to p. This can be seen, for example, because truth criteria can be revised at 
a later date, without being invalid at the time they were part of a practice (Ellenbogen p.104-111). 
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be authoritative, but there would need, in the case of professional expertise, to be 
independently existing criteria against which such a judgement could be validated. Saying 
that it is so, even by a prestigious individual, does not make it so, there needs to exist a 
practice in which the application of the criterion operates. 
 
The novice – competent practitioner – expert transition 
 
It is a well-established practice that an initial professional qualification is a guarantee of the 
ability of the holder of that qualification to competently perform the requirements of the 
occupation. The criteria for a person being competent are embedded in the assessment 
arrangements that govern the award of the qualification. Some initial qualifications, as we 
have noted, specify higher levels of competence that may be achieved initially, as with BTEC 
Merit and Distinction awards, which have their own criteria which are more demanding than 
those required for a pass. An alternative is to consign the formal specification of an ascent in 
expertise through the provision of further post initial qualifications as in the case of the 
German Meister Certificate. 
 
Fine-grained distinctions which allow for grading levels of expertise 
 
The existence of formal criteria for ascent in expertise are relatively easy to understand and 
are well-established. A tougher proposition for a criterial account is the use of informal 
criteria for establishing both absolute prowess (progression from original competent state) 
and relative prowess (expertise relative to other practitioners). These kinds of judgements are 
made constantly in professional contexts and occur in circumstances in which intelligence 
epithets relevant to the occupation are deployed. How does one judge that one advocate is 
more persuasive than another, that a teacher has become more sensitive to the needs of her 
pupils over a period of months or that a journalist has become more astute in following up a 
lead? (See Lum on expansive assessment in this volume.) Judgements are invariably made by 
peers who are themselves more than competent, and may well themselves be expert relative 
to others in the field. They belong to a community who make judgements of this kind on a 
regular basis.  
 
However, this is not enough in itself to establish criteria for the accurate application of 
intelligence epithets. There must exist a practice amongst experts of judging constitutive and 
10 
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relative expertise and such judgements have to be put to the test through justification if 
necessary. Claim and justification will relate to how the agent practises occupational 
activities in relation to the aims of that activity, or to what MacIntyre (1981) calls its internal 
goods. We cannot rely on individual judgements of this kind if they are unmediated by some 
form of check, otherwise they become no more than statements of subjective opinion. This 
check has to come from the established activities of judging, explaining and justifying 
judgements and reaching agreement with other experts, perhaps using past experience, 
analogies and reference to aims and both internal and external goods.13 In other words, 
criteria for expertise arise within and are sustained by the activities of making qualitative 
judgements about professional action within a professional community. They are meaningful 
because they are constantly having to be renewed through explanation, debate and 
justification. Where these are not present to a sufficient degree, it is difficult to maintain that 
judgements are undergirded by criteria. 
 
The point is a very important one for judgement of professional expertise. Formal criteria, 
such as are found in assessment practices for the award of a qualification, have to be applied. 
They need to be understood in such a way that those who apply them can agree in their 
judgements. Having formal criteria is not even a necessary, let alone a sufficient, condition of 
reliable criterial judgement if it is not sustained by a common view about how those criteria 
are to be applied, for example by specifying hours of study and content (Ofqual 2016). This 
can only come about if the kinds of informal practices described above underpin the use of 
the formal criteria. One further condition needs to be in place for the existence of a criterial 
practice. Once agreement is reached, it is accepted as authoritative, the judgement of the 
(relative) expert practitioners in the practice is authoritative and cannot be subject to 
legitimate questioning.14 The variety of the kinds of intelligence epithets to be applied, 
ranging from the situational, technical, theoretical, social, and aesthetic to the moral 
dimensions, ensures that the range of facets of performance that need to be judged for their 
                                                          
13 See Hager (2011) for an argument that internal and external goods are closely related. The controversy over 
Walter von Stolzing’s prize song in Wagner’s the Meistersingers provides an example of the pitfalls of using 
very rigid criteria in judging excellence. 
14 Care needs to be taken with this point. Others may disagree, but the judgement of the expert community 
must hold for any high stakes decisions such as awarding prizes, qualifications, promotion etc, unless it can be 
shown that the criteria were not properly followed. In this sense, the judgements of the occupational 
community are indefeasible. This does not mean that the criteria which sustain judgements cannot be revised 
over time. Indeed they often are. Occupational practices usually do change over time, even if the change is 
sometimes almost imperceptible. See Ellenbogen (2003) for more on the distinction between defeasibility and 
revisability in relation to the application of criteria. 
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relative expertise is covered. We can therefore conclude that the informal application of 
intelligence epithets within expert groups within occupational communities underpins 
criterial judgements of occupational expertise. 
 
The Assessment of Expertise in Multiple Situations and in Hypothetical Situations 
 
It is an important feature of many professional practices that they encompass a variety of 
different situations and contexts, making the practicality of direct observation of action 
problematic. How can expertise criteria be applied in such circumstances? We need first to 
distinguish between assessing expertise in multiple situations, from assessing it in 
hypothetical ones. First, one would expect the appropriate degree of flexibility and situational 
awareness in exercising know-how across a varied landscape of different situations and the 
criteria for expertise would need to recognise ability to adapt to varied situations, for relative 
expertise quite possibly to a considerably greater degree than for an agent who is just 
competent. Keestra, in this volume, makes good points about this, drawing attention to the 
expert managing automatic responses and situational adaptability while, at the same time, 
keeping in mind the aims of the activity (see also Hager 2011). All those who are competent 
will be expected to do this, but one would expect an enhanced ability from an expert, which 
could include a better understanding of the situation from a theoretical perspective (what 
evidence of this kind might be evidence of) and enhanced perceptual ability (see Winch in 
this volume). 
 
Given the variety of situations that a complex occupation is likely to offer, it is unlikely that 
assessment at any level is likely to be able to encompass in situ assessment in anything other 
than a small proportion of them. The assessment of expertise in such situations depends on 
forming a judgement as to the agent’s understanding of a situation on the one hand and on 
the quality of the kinds of explanation they offer concerning courses of action on the other. In 
such circumstances one would expect a profound grasp of the systematic knowledge 
underpinning the occupation, coupled with an ability to know where to access relevant 
knowledge if necessary, together with an ability to apply that knowledge to complex 
situational circumstances (c.f. Eraut 1994). Once again, formal criteria can be deployed to 
assist with judgements in such situations, but as pointed out above, such formality depends on 
12 
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an underlying practice of making judgements which, in turn, depend on something like 
agreement in judgement (Wittgenstein 1953 §242).15  
 
Underlying Theoretical Knowledge 
 
We have already noted the importance of underlying theoretical knowledge in forming 
judgements about actions in hypothetical situations. But what can we say about the 
possession of relevant theoretical knowledge in terms of expertise? The relative expert is in 
possession of a considerable amount of applicable theoretical knowledge which s/he should 
be able to readily deploy. One would normally expect such knowledge to be wider and deeper 
than that of the competent practitioner and thus to involve considerable further study (see 
Syben 2008 on the Polier, a senior construction worker in Germany). Such grasp involves 
being able to find one’s way around the body of knowledge, by being able to make 
appropriate connections through inference and perhaps most notably by being able to 
demonstrate the ability to critically assess or even to advance the body of knowledge. Such 
abilities mark the difference between a technician (an applier of theoretical knowledge) on 
the one hand and a technologist (a contributor to the practical side of the theoretical 
knowledge) on the other, and perhaps even a role as a researcher within the relevant field 
(Winch 2013). It is not difficult to see that the criteria for ascent to such a level of 
professional expertise can be handled through largely academic criteria of excellence, albeit 
adapted to the need to demonstrate relevance to professional action. For this, professional 
curricula are required, adapted to the needs of the technologist rather than the non-applied 
researcher. Such curricula provide the basis for formal criteria for the assessment of 
underlying theoretical knowledge. 
 
Tacit Knowledge 
 
What, finally, of the tacit knowledge that is so important a feature of expert professional 
practice? By its nature, this cannot be adequately captured in discursive criteria, so we are 
                                                          
15 We do not mean by ‘practice’ anything that carrries a great deal of philosophical baggage such as is to be 
found in MacIntyre’s work. A practice is a collective way of acting and judging which carries its own normative 
order. It is closely related to the concept of a normative activity as described in Baker and Hacker 1985. That 
said, MacIntyre’s account of practices has some useful features, most notably in emphasising features that are 
common to a lot of normative activities, including the kind that we are concerned with here. These include the 
activity having a point and the satisfactions that are to be gained from participation (one aspect of MacIntyre’s 
‘goods’). 
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obliged, if we are to use criteria at all, to accept that these must be informal, but it does not 
imply that in terms of professional expertise, we have to accept that they are implicit. The 
assessment of professional expertise sets more demanding conditions than the assessment of 
expertise more generally, because the stakes are higher. Thus, even if one does not expect 
complete reliance on formally stated criteria, there must be a basis for justification of 
judgements and this in turn implies the ability to debate the applicability of informally held 
criteria in coming to judgements and then, usually, benchmarking these against formal 
criteria. Thus the possession of tacit knowledge can fall under a criterial account of expertise. 
 
We can conclude, through a sketch of how a criterial account of expertise might work, that it 
is at the very least a plausible way of thinking about, not only competent practice 
(constitutive expertise), but the way in which expert practice (relative expertise) might be 
distinguished from competent practice. 
 
Implications of the Contributions to the Design and Conduct of Professional Education and 
Assessment 
 
The remainder of this introduction will deal briefly with how the discussions in this volume 
impact upon professional education and assessment in both constitutive and relative senses of 
expertise.  It has already been noted that the way in which we deal with expertise in 
professional action differs in significant ways from how it is dealt with in non-work and non-
professional situations more generally. Professional education almost invariably takes place 
within a formal structure with its own specific educational categories. Thus we expect certain 
values to underlie a profession and these should receive embodiment both in the aims of the 
professional education and quite probably in a specific code of ethics. We also expect to find 
a prescribed content for that education at varying levels of qualification, in other words, a 
curriculum. Pedagogy can be quite variegated as it is likely to include episodes in a 
classroom, simulated professional experience and a considerable amount of work-based 
learning, perhaps necessitating specialised forms of pedagogic expertise. Finally, assessment 
is almost certain to loom large as the guarantee that a practitioner is competent or expert has 
to be accepted, not just within the profession itself, but by the government and the public. 
 
So what implications do our contributions have for our understanding of these requirements? 
Let us first have a look at the values and aims that underpin professional education. These 
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will be intimately related to the values and aims of the occupation for which it is a 
preparation. Who should those be, whose responsibility it is to articulate and maintain those 
values and aims? One natural response is to mention those who are experts within the 
profession. However, since it is most likely that the profession will have an impact not only 
its clients but also on the broader society affected by its operations, it would be natural to 
assume that those others affected ought also to have a role, even though they may not be 
experts in either sense of that term. Whatever arrangements are actually made, the role of 
experts within the occupation is likely to be critical. They are, in a sense, the custodians of 
the occupation and the interpreters of its interests. It is quite likely that they will hold their 
roles of influence through appointment or election to trade unions or to collegial bodies 
concerned with the governance of the profession.16  
 
One of the most important elements of professional education is the design of the curriculum. 
For the importance of perception in this see Winch in this volume. Before this can be done 
however, the aims of education in any given profession have to be negotiated. Some, 
however, might dispute this. They might argue that the important issue is what a practitioner 
can do and secondly, what he has to know in order to do what he has to do. This means 
enumerating the kinds of things that he has to do and then inferring  what he needs to know in 
order to do what he has to do. Here we have two contrasting approaches to the design of a 
professional education. We deliberately do not say to the design of a professional curriculum, 
because it is not clear that, in this latter conception of professional education, a fully 
articulated curriculum is required. Even if it is, it can be set out in terms of a series of 
learning outcomes and associated assessment criteria for those outcomes. Broadly speaking, 
this approach is well-suited to an occupational governance approach where the employer is 
the primary determinant of the professional qualification. The employer works out what the 
required professional tasks will be and it is the job of the qualification designer to translate 
these into learning outcomes and assessment criteria.  This, broadly speaking, is the approach 
adopted in the UK. Such an approach typically leads to a preoccupation with the tasks that 
need to be accomplished and hence to the know-how needed to accomplish them. It is often 
assumed that once the tasks have been carefully specified, the skills needed to undertake them 
                                                          
16 In some European countries, occupational governance occurs through social partnership, an arrangement 
whereby trade unions, employer organisations and the state collectively determine the nature and structure of 
the values, aims and curriculum of a professional education (see Streeck 1992; Brockmann, Clarke and Winch 
2011). 
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successfully can be deduced. We will call this generic approach to professional curriculum 
design the learning outcomes approach. 
 
The major alternative is to think in terms of the aims of the occupation and to reflect its 
values in the explicit aims stated. Thus, one might think in terms of what one would like a 
doctor, lawyer, engineer, plumber, teacher or farmer to be like in terms of their values, the 
scope of their activities and the primary abilities that they are going to require. For example, 
one might wish to think of a doctor as someone with the technical ability to engage in 
diagnostic and curative work, but also with the attributes of a teacher who can help prevent 
illness through addressing prevention by advice and education. A doctor might also need to 
be a scholar, not only to master the underlying theoretical knowledge that forms the basis of 
the great majority of his professional judgements, but also in order to maintain his knowledge 
within the field and, potentially to become an advancer of knowledge within the profession, 
whether as a technologist or as a researcher. Thus the aim of the professional education of a 
doctor might be to develop a person who is, in medical terms a technician, someone who can 
operate in a theoretically informed way across the range of diagnostic and curative roles 
expected; as a scholar able to keep up with developments in the field and to be potentially 
capable of contributing to those developments and as an educator who can assist good health 
with preventative work among the public and perhaps act as a mentor to junior members of 
the profession. It would be natural then, to think about the kind of curriculum and pedagogy 
that would be necessary to develop a practitioner with those attributes. We will call this broad 
approach to professional curriculum design a holistic approach.  
 
While the learning outcomes approach starts with the tasks to be performed by the agent, the 
holistic approach starts with broad attributes and works steadily downwards to greater detail 
in terms of specific knowledge and abilities. Thus, at a relatively early stage in the design of 
the curriculum we might wish to come to a decision about the degree of independence and the 
degree of ability to engage in teamwork independently of managerial supervision that we 
might wish for from the agent. This, in turn, might lead us to consider the extent to which the 
agent would be expected to plan, control, coordinate and communicate as well as his ability 
to evaluate the quality of his own work, either individually or in teams. Appreciating that 
there may be multiple realisations of these abilities, particularly in varied situations, we might 
hesitate to specify the skills necessary to carry them out, while ensuring that the agent had 
available an array that was sufficient to cope with all contingencies. Furthermore, experts 
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with responsibility within the curriculum design team would realise that the routine carrying 
out of skills, however conscientiously performed, would not be sufficient for competent 
performance and would ensure that pedagogical approaches were adopted that ensured as far 
as was possible, that candidates for a professional qualification approached their work with 
the requisite level of seriousness and attention to ensure, for example, not just that planning 
or coordination skills were exercised, but that they were actually able to plan and coordinate. 
Such an approach would not exclude the development of a large array of quite specific 
technical skills, but would ensure that they were placed within a framework of broader 
occupational capacities.  
 
These two broad approaches to professional curriculum design reflect design philosophies to 
be found in Northern Europe in the case of holistic qualifications and in the English-speaking 
countries in the case of the learning outcomes approach. What implications do these design 
philosophies have for the development of expertise in both the constitutive and relative 
senses? It should here be stressed that these two contrasting approaches are ‘ideal types’ and 
in practice hybrid versions of each will often be found.  
 
Aims and values  
Holistic-type qualifications tend to stress high-level objectives within a moral and civic 
context. Thus qualifications within the German Dual System emphasise overall (and 
reflective) occupational capacity (Nehls 2014; Bosch 2014) before breaking these down into 
subcomponents, called ‘Kompetenzen’, although these bear only a superficial resemblance to 
competences in the English sense. Although these qualifications are primarily related to 
constitutive expertise, they include the competence to maintain and improve one’s expertise 
(called Methodenkompetenz  -see 
http://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/Definition/methodenkompetenz.html), described, 
incidentally in terms of Fähigkeiten, rather than Fertigkeiten or skills.).17 Another example 
concerns the German federal standards for teachers. Among five overarching aims is included 
the ability to develop one’s expertise (Kultusministerkonferenz  2004, standards for teacher 
education, p.4). By contrast, in the learning outcome framework influential in the UK, 
overarching aims tend not to be emphasised and indeed may not appear at all. Thus the BTEC 
Diploma in Agriculture at level 3 only contains aims for each module in the overall 
                                                          
17 Gabler Wirtschaftslexicon, consulted January 2017. 
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qualification, each one framed in terms of knowledge, skill and understanding necessary to 
carry out certain tasks (City and Guilds 2012). Teaching qualifications in England are based 
around standards, but these are standards of compliance rather than of overarching aims for 
the profession of teaching. Even British medical education does not have overarching aims, 
concerning what a doctor should be, but rather a set of criteria prescribing what a doctor 
should and should not do. These come close to the kind of standards used for German 
teachers but are expressed more in terms of compliance rather than overarching competences  
(http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/professionalism_in_action.asp) 
This contrasts with the stated aims of German medical education, which have an overarching 
aim of a doctor who is both scientifically and practically competent, who takes individual 
responsibility for his/her actions and who is capable of both further education in medicine but 
also in deepening and extending existing competences.  
(https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/_appro_2002/BJNR240500002.html) 
There follow seven sub-aims, which include the social and historical dimensions of medical 
practice. 
  
Curricula  
Quite often learning outcome style qualifications do not have explicit curricula. Where they 
do, as in some BTEC qualifications, learning outcomes play the role of module aims. These 
are ‘hybrid’ learning outcome qualifications, as they use the learning outcome terminology 
but are in fact content-based. By contrast, many professional qualifications of the learning 
outcome variety do not set out explicit curricula. These can only be inferred from the learning 
outcomes and associated assessment criteria. The position is somewhat different for 
qualifications at level 4 and above, although for example some teaching qualifications appear 
to have little if anything in terms of curricula (see the proposed Apprenticeship in Teaching). 
By contrast, medical qualifications, which bear more of a resemblance to holistic 
qualifications, do. Holistic style qualifications, by contrast, almost always set out the 
prescribed content that needs to be learned in order to meet aims. 
 
Pedagogy  
Within a holistic conception the integration of theory and practice needs to be built in to 
articulated sequences of classroom, simulatory environment and workplace. By contrast in 
the case of learning outcome qualifications workplace or near workplace performance is the 
ideal to be aimed for. There is much less mandatory use of procedures for developing the 
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ability to integrate systematic knowledge with practice, although this is still the case with 
many qualifications at level 4 and above, particularly those in the traditional professions. It 
should also be noted that the higher level professional qualifications in Germany also 
prescribe a mixture of very extensive demonstrable workplace competence showing relative 
expertise, with extensive formal study. 
 
Assessment  
In the case of holistic qualifications, full occupational capacity is aimed for, which requires a 
series of assessments that can capture its full range.  This may well include advanced 
workplace competence, particularly at the relative expertise level for higher qualifications. In 
the case of Learning Outcome qualifications, workplace competence according to assessment 
instruments derived from Learning Outcomes and assessment criteria is deemed to be 
sufficient. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Theorising expertise matters for effective professional practice and its development so the 
preceding philosophical discussions have important applications for educational practice, 
curriculum design and assessment. There is nothing as practical as a good theory and we 
neglect the philosophy of professional education at our peril.  
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